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ABSTRACT 
Using expected utility theory to choose the best decision presumes that the decision 
maker can specify the utility of various alternative decisions for each of the possible 
events that might occur. Since decision makers can rarely foresee all possible eventuali- 
ties, extending Bayesian probability theory to treat unforeseen events is essential to 
applying expected utility theory to certain problems. We propose that Bayesian theory 
accommodate unforeseen events by classifying them as similar to sets of foreseen events 
using similarity templates. The resulting extension of the individual's ubjective probabil- 
ities to the space of foreseen and unforeseen redefines ubjective probabilities over the 
power set of the set of all foreseen events. This leads to a new probability function over 
the space of foreseen events--which is the pignistic probability from the transferable 
belief model 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Expected Uti l ity without Unforeseen Events 
Standard applications of expected utility theory evaluate the desirability 
of different decisions by 
1. listing every possible eventuality E which might occur (let F denote 
the resulting set of foreseen possible events), 
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2. assigning each event E a probability Pr(E) [with Ee ~ F Pr(E) = 1], 
3. assessing the utility of each decision given each foreseen event, 
u(dlE), 
4. choosing decision d over d* if 
Pr(E) u(dlE) > ~ Pr(E) u(d*lE). (1) 
E~F E~F 
A key step in this analysis is listing all events that might occur. But as 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein [2] note, many real problems 
involve events the decision maker did not foresee. While brainstorm- 
ing and other processes can improve a decision maker's ability to 
foresee more eventualities, foreseeing all possible events still re- 
mains extremely difficult in many real problems. 1 
1.2. Expected Utility with Unforeseen Events 
To apply expected utility theory while recognizing the possibility of 
unforeseen events, the decision maker must 
1. list every eventuality E that he foresees as possible occurrences (let F 
be the set of foreseen events), 
2. add F c to this list if something unforeseen might occur, 
3. assign each event E and F c a probability Pr(E) [with ]Ee~ F Pr(E) + 
Pr(F c) = 1], 
4. assess the utility of each decision given each foreseen event, u(dlE), 
5. assess the utility of each decision given the set of unforeseen events, 
F c , 
6. choose decision d over d* if 
Pr(E) u(dlE) > ~ Pr(E) u(d*lE). (2) 
EcFvF"  E~FvF  c 
The most common way of assigning utilities to unforeseen events (step 5) 
is to implicitly assume 
ASSUMPTION 0 For any I ~ F c, u(dlI) = u(dlFC). 
Thus all unforeseen events can be treated in the same way. This 
assumption is then commonly operationalized by one of the two following 
I Furthermore, computational considerations might lead an analyst who could enumerate all 
possible ventualities to deliberately exclude some of them in constructing F. Thus see [13]. 
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further assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION 0.1 For some u 0, u(d[F c) = u o for all d ~ D. 
That is, we assume that if something unforeseen happens, any decision 
leads to the same--probably undesirable--utility. 
Given this assumption, the expected utility criterion in (2) becomes 
equivalent o (1) with Pr(E) replaced by Pr(E[F), enabling the decision 
maker to implement expected utility as if there were no unforeseen events. 
ASSUMPTION 0.2 For some default decision do, u(dolF c) > u o with 
u(dlF c) = Uo, d ~ d o . 
Assumption 0.2 is superior to Assumption 0.1 in requiring the decision 
maker to devise an appropriate decision do (like "stop and reanalyze the 
situation") if something totally unforeseen happens. 
While these are not unreasonable approaches, they both presume As- 
sumption 0. And as the next section argues, Assumption 0 can be false, 
e.g., in the case in which some unforeseen events are very similar to some 
foreseen events and thus should be assigned the same utilities as those 
foreseen events. To formalize this notion of similarity, the next section 
adapts pattern recognition techniques to classify similarities between fore- 
seen and unforeseen events. This leads to an alternative to Assumption 0
which is equivalent to replacing subjective probabilities defined over the 
space of foreseen and unforeseen events by subjective probabilities defined 
over the power set of the space of foreseen events. 
2. CLASSIFYING UNFORESEEN EVENTS USING FORESEEN 
EVENTS 
2.1. Why Assumption 0 is False 
Suppose a furniture distributor must make some set of decisions D 
about merchandising an unknown product. He foresees the unknown 
product as being either a brown wooden desk or a brown wooden table or 
a black steel filing cabinet or a black wooden bed. (These four events make 
up the set F.) 
Now suppose the utility for all the furniture distributor's possible deci- 
sions D is contingent only on the composition (made of wood versus not 
made of wood) and functionality (useful for clerical purposes, not useful 
for clerical purposes) of the unknown product. Further suppose the un- 
foreseen event PRODUCT IS A BLACK WOODEN DESK occurs .  Since this 
unforeseen event has precisely the same key characteristics (i.e., precisely 
the same composition and functionality) as the foreseen event PRODUCT IS 
A BROWN WOODEN DESK, a decision's utility given that unforeseen event 
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will equal the decision's utility given the foreseen event PRODUCT IS A 
BROWN WOODEN DESK. Similarly, a decision's utility given the unforeseen 
event, PRODUCT IS A BROWN STEEL FILING CABINET should be the same as 
that decision's utility given the foreseen event PRODUCT IS A BLACK STEEL 
FILING CABINET. Since a decision's utility given the foreseen event PRODUCT 
IS A BROWN WOODEN DESK could differ from a decision's utility given the 
foreseen event PRODUCT IS A bROWN STEEL FILING CABINET, we conclude 
that the two unforeseen events PRODUCT IS A BLACK WOODEN DESK and 
PRODUCT IS A BROWN STEEL FILING CABINET could have different utilities, 
thus violating Assumption 0. 
If we denote the foreseen event PRODUCT IS A BROWN WOODEN DESK by 
E, then the next section proposes denoting the unforeseen event PRODUCT 
IS A BLACK WOODEN DESK by I e, indicating the occurrence of an unforeseen 
event with the same practical consequences a the foreseen event 2 E. 
More generally, let A be a union of some of the atomic events in the set 
of foreseen events, e.g., the union of the events PRODUCT IS A BROWN 
WOODEN DESK, PRODUCT IS A BLACK STEEL FILING CABINET, PRODUCT IS A 
BROWN WOODEN TABLE. Those three events all have different ratings on 
the first characteristic and the same ratings on the second characteristic, 
i.e., they differ in composition but have the same functionality. Hence it 
seems natural to say that the key characteristic of the compound event A 
is its clerical functionality. Now consider the unforeseen event PRODUCT IS 
A METAL CHAIR. This event is not similar to either of these three events. 
But a metal chair is used for clerical functions and therefore shares that 
characteristic which the filing cabinet, desk, and table all have in common. 
Hence the next section classifies this unforeseen event as I A, indicating 
that it has all the traits shared in common by all the foreseen events in A. 
2.2. Similarity Templates 
To formalize these ideas, we assume that the utility of a decision given 
an atomic event E is completely determined by the event's characteristics, 
Ck(E), k = 1 . . . .  , m. As a result, if E and E* have precisely the same set 
of characteristics [i.e., Ck(E)= Q(E*), k = 1 . . . . .  m], then u(dlE)= 
u(dlE*) for any d ~ D. We will refer to (CI(E) . . . . .  Cm(E)) as the string 
associated with event E. 
If A is the union of atomic events, then we similarly define A's key 
characteristics to be (CI(A) . . . . .  Cm(A)), where Q(A)= Ck(E) if all 
atomic events E ~ A have the same rating on characteristic k. If the 
2This notion of classifying all events with the same practical implications as event E as I E is 
analogous to the common practice of simplifying influence diagrams by collapsing all events 
with the same implications into a single event [13]. 
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atomic events in A do not share the same rating on characteristic k, then 
Ck(A)  = #. The # symbol, which Goldberg [3] referred to as the wild card 
symbol, indicates that the kth characteristic is not something which all 
atomic events in A have in common, and therefore is not essential to 
defining what is common to all atomic events in A. In Holland's terminol- 
ogy [5], (C I (A)  . . . . .  Cm(A)) , in addition to being the string associated with 
event A, is a schema, i.e., a similarity template describing a subset of all 
possible strings with similarities at certain positions. 
Now suppose that E and E* are identical on all key characteristics, i.e., 
Ck(E)  = Ck(E*) ,  k = 1 . . . .  m.  Then CI,(E v E*)  = CI,(E). Hence the 
strings associated with E, E*, and E v E* will all induce the same 
schema. If A is the union of all events whose strings are equivalent to this 
schema, we label this schema IA. We will say that a schema matches a 
particular string if the kth characteristic n the schema matches the kth 
characteristic n the string (k = 1, . . . ,  m), with a wild card being construed 
as matching anything. Thus the schema I F represents those key features 
which all foreseen events have in common and necessarily matches every 
foreseen event. Since an unforeseen event which has nothing in common 
with any event in the frame might occur, we define the schema consisting 
of only wild cards as /~. 
Suppose that all characteristics are rescaled to range between 0 and 1. 
Then we define characteristic k's importance as how much the utility 
changes when all characteristics but k are set to baseline levels and the 
value of characteristic k is changed from 0 to 1. Thus if the utility 
associated with characteristics C 1 . . . .  , Cm were u = Ek w~Ck, then charac- 
teristic k would have an importance of w k. For simplicity, we normalize w k 
by dividing characteristic k's importance by the average of the importances 
assigned to all of the m different characteristics. 
In genetic algorithms, the order of a string is the number of characteris- 
tics which are not wild cards. For this paper, we need to generalize this 
notion of order by correcting for the relative importance of different 
characteristics. To do so, let I k = 1 if the kth characteristic of a string is 
not set to a wildcard rating (with I k = 0 else). Then the order of a string is 
S, k w~l  k. Thus the order of a string measures the degree of similarity 
between all the events matched by that string. Since we are interested in 
matching unforeseen events with foreseen events which are as similar as 
possible, we prefer to match unforeseen events with schema of higher 
order, i.e., of maximum specificity. 
When an unforeseen event arises, we first compute its rating on each of 
the m characteristics to deduce its corresponding string. If I A is the 
maximum order schema matching this string, we label the unforeseen 
event I A. This rule will associate the unforeseen event with the most 
general subset of F which matches the unforeseen event on as many 
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characteristics as possible. We similarly classify a foreseen event E as I A if 
I A is the maximum order schema matching the event's string. 
2.3. Example 
Our previous example had two key characteristics,the composition char- 
acteristic (with the two ratings of wooden and nonwooden) and the 
functionality characteristic (with the two ratings of clerical and nonclerical). 
Our procedure would assign strings to events as follows: 
• PRODUCT IS A BROWN WOODEN DESK ~ (wooden, clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS A BROWN WOODEN TABLE ~ (wooden, clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS A BLACK STEEL FILING CABINET ~ (nonwooden, clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS A BLACK WOODEN BED ~ (wooden, nonclerical) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK OR A BROWN WOODEN 
TABLE ~ (wooden, clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK OR A BLACK STEEL FILING 
CABINET ~ (#,clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK OR A BLACK WOODEN BED 
= (wooden, #) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN TABLE OR A BLACK STEEL FILING 
CABINET = (#,clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN TABLE OR A BLACK WOODEN BED 
(wooden, #) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BLACK STEEL FILING CABINET OR A BLACK 
WOODEN BED ~ (#,#)  
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK, A BROWN WOODEN TABLE, 
OR A BLACK STEEL FILING CABINET ~ (#,  clerical) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK, A BROWN WOODEN TABLE, 
OR A BLACK WOODEN BED =~ (wooden, #) 
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK, A BLACK STEEL FILING 
CABINET, OR g BLACK WOODEN BED =~ (#,  #)  
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN TABLE, A BLACK STEEL FILING 
CABINET, OR A BLACK WOODEN BED ~ (#,  #)  
• PRODUCT IS EITHER A BROWN WOODEN DESK, A BROWN WOODEN TABLE, 
A BLACK STEEL FILING CABINET, OR A BLACK WOODEN BED =a (#,  #)  
Now we label each schema with the most comprehensive s t whose string 
induces that schema. Hence our schemata re labeled as follows: 
• (wooden, clerical) =~/desk, table" 
• (wooden, nonclerical) =/bed" 
• (nonwooden, clerical) = /'cabinet" 
• (wooden, #) ~ /desk, table,bed" 
• (#, clerical) = /desk, table,cabinet" 
• (# '  #)  :=0 /desk, table, cabinet, bed = /0" 
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In this example, the foreseen events differ on both of the key characteris- 
tics, which makes I F =/e .  This will not always be the case; e.g., if we had a 
third key characteristic called animate versus inanimate, then all of our 
foreseen events would have had one characteristic in common, being 
inanimate. In that case, I F would have included all cases in which products 
were inanimate objects, and /e would have been reserved for those cases 
in which products were animate. Also note that there is no schema for 
(nonwooden, onclerical), since none of the objects in F were both non- 
wooden and nonclerical. 
Now suppose the unforeseen event PRODUCT IS A STEEL DESK occurs.  
The corresponding string is (nonwooden, clerical), leading us to label this 
unforeseen event with the schema /cabinet" This reflects the fact that the 
furniture distributor's decisions about the product only depend on its 
composition and its functionality. From this perspective, the steel desk is 
more similar to the filing cabinet han it is to the brown wooden desk. 
As another example, suppose the unforeseen event PRODUCT IS A BRASS 
BED occurs. The corresponding string is (nonwooden, onclerical). Since we 
have not defined any schema for this string, we must first determine 
whether to match this string with (nonwooden, #), (#,nonclerical), or 
(#, #). If we determine that functionality is more important than composi- 
tion, then we match (nonwooden, onclerical) with (#, nonclerical). Hence 
we label this unforeseen event as /bed" 
Using such an algorithm 3 maps all events in F v F c into the power set 
of F. 
3. EXPECTED UTILITY WITH PIGNISTIC PROBABILITIES 
Having redefined our sample space to be the power set of F, we next 
define 
m A = er(IAI/~) 
to be the probability of an event associated with the schema I A given the 
nonoccurrence of the totally unforeseen event/e- (We also define m e = 0.) 
3Note that an analyst could have alternatively redefined his partition of events in terms of all 
possible occurrences of different m-tuples of characteristics. Since there are no unforeseen 
events in this partition, applying probability theory is straightforward. But since utilities have 
not been defined over all possible occurrences of various m-tuples of characteristics, further 
assumptions would be needed to specify the utilities for m-tuples associated with unforeseen 
events. This need leads to the approach used in this paper. 
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Note that F-,A ~_ F mA = 1, SO that m satisfies the same formal properties as 
basic belief masses [10, 11]. The condition (2) for preferring d to d* 
becomes 
Pr(/~) u(dl/~) + [1 - Pr(/~)l ~ mAu(d[I A) 
Ac_F 
> Pr(/~)u(d*l/~) + [1 - Pr(/~)] ~ mAU(d*IIA). 
AcF  
(3) 
For some arbitrarily chosen decision do, define 
Pr(/z) 
v(d) = [u(d0[/o) - u(dlI~] 1 - Pr ( /~ 
to be the amount by which the utility of decision d differs from the default 
decision's utility given a totally unforeseen event /o- We rewrite (3) as 
mA[u(d[I A) - v(d)] > ~ mA[U(d*lI A) -- v(d*)], (4) 
Ac_F Ac_F 
so that utilities are defined relative to the "baseline utility" v. If Assump- 
tion 0.1 applies to totally unforeseen events /~, then v(d) = 0. If Assump- 
tion 0.2 applies, then there is one decision d o which is preferable given/e. 
Specifying v(d) then requires pecifying how much d0's utility exceeds any 
other decision's utility given /e. 
We additionally need to specify the utilities assigned to d and d* 
conditioned on I A. To do so, first suppose that decision d gives the same 
utility for all events which are subsets of some compound event A. This 
might occur if, for example, decision d's utility only depended on the 
characteristics which all events in A had in common. In this case, the 
decision's utility given the unforeseen event IA equals the decision's utility 
given any event, 4 i.e., 
ASSUMPTION i u(dl I  A) = u(dlE), E cA  IF u (d lE )= u(dlE*), E, E* 
EA.  
Now suppose that different events in A assign different utilities to 
decision d, i.e., the characteristics that all events in A share in common 
only partially determine a decision's utility given those events. This paper 
assumes 5 a decision's utility given I A is just the mean utility of any event in 
4There are, of course, obvious counterexamples to this presupposition. Nonetheless it is not 
an unreasonable rule of thumb. 
5We could have alternatively assumed that, in these cases, a decision's utility given I A equals 
the default utility u 0. This is the approach considered in the Appendix. 
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A, i.e., we generalize Assumption 1 to 
ASSUMPTION 2 u(dlIA) = [EECA u(dlE)]/IAI, where IAI is the number 
of atomic events in A. 
Given this assumption, Equation (4) becomes 
m A 
E [u (d lE ) -  v(d)] E ~-~ >- ~ [u (d* lE ) -  v(d*)] ~ mA 
E~F ApE e~F Ape IAI" (5) 
Now the pignistic probability from the transferable belief model [1, 11, 12] 
is defined by 
A~EmA = Em A IA & El 
Bet P(E)  = IAI A IAI ' E ~ F, 
and more generally by 
IB & i l  
Bet P(S)  = ~_,m A (6) 
A IAI 
Note that for any partition of the sample space, this pignistic probability is 
necessarily additive. 6 Combining (5) and (6) gives 
}-'.Bet P(E)  [u(dlE) - v(d)] > ~]Bet P(E)  [u(d*]E) - v(d*)]. (7) 
E E 
Hence Bayesian theory, applied to a space of foreseen and unforeseen 
events, leads to expected utility theory with pignistic probabilities. 
APPENDIX: USING ASSUMPTION 0 AS A DEFAULT 
Define Bu(d)cF  so that Bu(d) is the largest set such that A _c 
Bu(d) ~ u(dl I  A) = u. We say that Bu(d) occurs if either E ~ Bu(d) 
occurs or IA, A C_ Bu(d) , occurs. The probability of Bu(d) occurring is just 
Shafer's lower probability 
P , (Bu(d) )  = y" m A. 
A c Bu(d) 
6Since E A c_ 8 re (A)  < Bet P(  B ) < F A n B ,~  m(A), the pignistic probability is bounded by 
Shafer's belief and plausibility functions. 
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When Assumption 1 does not apply, we could invoke Assumption 0 by 
assuming 
ASSUMPTION 2' IF u(dlE) ~ u(dlE*) FOR ANY E, E* ~ A THEN u(dl l  A) 
= U 0 . 
Then A c_ F - U u Bu(d) ~ u(dllA) = Uo, and Equation (2) becomes 
~P. (Bu(d) )u  + (1 -  ~P. (Bu(d) ) )u  o 
u u 
u u 
Defining the ratio scale utility v = u - u 0 gives 
~P,(Bv[d])v >__ S,P,(Bv[d*])v, 
u u 
which is expected utility theory with ratio scale utilities and lower probabil- 
ities. Thus Assumption 2' leads to a closer relationship between subjective 
probability theory and lower probabilities (and, indeed, allows for distinct 
upper and lower probabilities). However, Assumption 2' seems less appeal- 
ing than Assumption 2. 
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